

Here There Be Monsters

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Weierstrass's Monster

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Hermite 1893: **Je me détourne avec horreur et effroi de cette plaie lamentable des fonctions continues qui n'ont pas de dérivées.**

I turn away with horror and dread from this lamentable plague of continuous functions that have no derivatives.

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Are formally undecidable propositions necessarily monsters?

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
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the construction of higher and higher types . . . is necessary for proving theorems even of a relatively simple structure.

The Gödel Hierarchy



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So any counter-example could, in principle, be verified by a finite number of additions and multiplications of integers.

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Is it provable in PA?

Might one be able to obtain a model of PA in which FLT is false?

An Example from Harvey Friedman: (independence from ZFC)

Proposition HF: If S is an order invariant subset of Q_r^{2n} , then there is a rigid maximal square in S .

An Example from Harvey Friedman

Definition

Q_r is the set of rational numbers q such that $|q| \leq r$. This discussion is in terms of elements and subsets of $Q_r^{2^n}$. For $x \in Q_r^{2^n}$ the i -th component of x is written x_i .

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Note: Much more can be said about the place of SRP in the large cardinal hierarchy.

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Gödel in 1951 on contemporary mathematics using only the lowest levels of what I am calling the Gödel Hierarchy: “this ... may have something to do with ... [the] inability to prove ... for example Riemann’s hypothesis despite many years of effort.”