

Security of Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

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(Following Lo & Chau)

History

BB 84

Ekert 91

? B 92

9/6 →


⋮
Lo-Chan '98

Mayers '98 , BBBMR '99

Shor-Preskill '00

Ben-Or '00

⋮



$$|00\rangle + |11\rangle$$



Ekert 91 / Lo-Chau 98

- (I) Alice (or Eve) prepares EPR pairs and send half of each pair to Bob
- (II) Alice & Bob perform Entanglement Purification
- (III) Measurement of almost clean EPR pairs.

Bell Basis for 2-qubits

$$\phi^{\pm} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle)$$

$$\psi^{\pm} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle)$$

Testing a pair: ψ^{-}
measure with equal probability
x-axis, y-axis, z-axis

outcome should always be different

x-axis	OK	for	ψ^{-}, ϕ^{-}	H
y-axis	OK	for	ψ^{-}, ϕ^{+}	(H)
z-axis	OK	for	ψ^{-}, ψ^{+}	I

Classical Game

P sends N object of type

W, X, Y, Z

claiming all are of type W

We can distinguish $\{W, X\}$ from $\{Y, Z\}$
or $\{W, Y\}$ " $\{X, Z\}$
or $\{W, Z\}$ " $\{X, Y\}$

Prob. testing $N-1$ that the last
one is not W

$$\leq \frac{e}{N} \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{e-1} \leq \frac{1}{N}$$

(if e are not W)

Quantum Scheme

Eve prepares

$$|u\rangle = \sum_{0 \leq i_1, \dots, i_N \leq 3} \sum_j \alpha_{i_1, \dots, i_N, j} |i_1, \dots, i_N\rangle \otimes |j\rangle$$

P-cheating =

$$= \frac{1}{N 3^{N-1}} \sum_{S_1} \sum_{S_2} \sum_{S_3} \sum'_{i_1, \dots, i_N} \sum_j |\alpha_{i_1, \dots, i_N, j}|^2$$

$|S_1 \cup S_2 \cup S_3| = N-1$, S_i disjoint

$$\begin{aligned} \sum' &= l \in S_1 & i_l &= 2, 3 \\ &= l \in S_2 & i_l &= 0, 3 \\ &= l \in S_3 & i_l &= 1, 3 \end{aligned}$$

(index 3 - Ψ^-)

Quantum to Classical

Eve prepares $|u\rangle = \dots$

and measures $|u\rangle$ in the Bell basis

$$\rho = \sum_{i_1, \dots, i_n} |d_{i_1, \dots, i_n, j}\rangle^2 |i_1\rangle\langle i_1| \dots |i_n\rangle\langle i_n| |j\rangle\langle j|$$

and sends this to Alice & Bob

Probability of cheating is exactly the same!

Better error bounds with
hashing test $P\text{-error} < 2^{-m}$
same quantum to classical
reduction

After testing

$$\langle \Psi^{\otimes N} | \rho_{AB} | \Psi^{\otimes N} \rangle \geq 1 - 2^{-m} = \delta$$

\Rightarrow Eve's information

$$S(\rho_E) = S(\rho_{AB}) \leq H(\delta) + N \cdot \delta$$

Now Alice & Bob measure and obtain a random Key of which Eve has essentially no information

Handling Errors

Use quantum computation codes working on "logical qubits" instead of unprotected qubits.