

Simple Security

Proof for QKD

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Proof Outline

The quantum communication complexity of the function


$$f(x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i y_i \pmod{2}$$

$$x, y \in \{0, 1\}^n$$

is high ($\Omega(n)$)

This is true for $f(x, h) = h(x)$

$x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $h \in \{\text{Universal hash function collection}\}$



Thm [ASTVW]


If $\Pr(h(x, y) = f(x, y)) \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2^k}$

then $k \geq \frac{1}{2}(n - l + 1)$

For one-way communication

$k \geq n - l + 1$

Proof Outline (Cont.)



If Eve has a small amount of information about S , with high probability we can compress this information to few, $\lambda \cdot n$ qubits!
($\lambda \ll 1$)

Goal: Show that if the probability of not detecting Eve is $> 2^{-\delta n}$ then we can compress Eve's state to $\lambda \cdot n$ qubits for some $\lambda < 1$.

For random $y \in \{0,1\}^n$ given later
Eve cannot predict $f(s,y) = s \cdot y \pmod{2}$
better than $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2^{(1-\lambda)n}}$

$$\left[t \text{ Times } \frac{1}{2^{(1-\lambda)n - t/2}} \right]$$

EPR pair via noisy channel

(I) Alice prepares n EPR pairs

$$\left(\frac{|00\rangle + |11\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right)^{\otimes n}$$

and sends half of each pair to Bob.

(II) A & B agree on random selection of X, Z measurements (publicly) and measure.

(III) A & B run error correction:

If "fail" they abort

Else apply privacy amplification

Notation:

$$\Phi = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$$

$$X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, Z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Bell Basis: Apply to Φ

$$I \otimes Z \quad \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle - |11\rangle)$$

$$I \otimes X \quad \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle + |10\rangle)$$

$$I \otimes XZ \quad \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)$$

Bell Basis for $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$

$J \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, $K \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, $I \in \{0, 1\}^n$

$$\Phi^{\otimes n} = \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \sum_I |I, I\rangle$$

$X_J =$ apply X to coordinates in J

$Z_K =$ " Z " " in K

Bell Basis

$$\Phi_{J,K} = \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \sum_I |I, X_J Z_K(I)\rangle$$

Purify Eve's attack the state of the system after phase (I)

$$\rho = \sum_{J,K} |\Phi_{J,K}, \Psi_{J,K}\rangle$$

where $\Psi_{J,K}$ some (un normalized) vectors in Eve's space

$$= \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \sum_{J,K} \sum_{\mathbf{I}} |\mathbf{I}, X_J Z_K(\mathbf{I}), \Psi_{JK}\rangle$$

Testing:

Alice and Bob measure $X \otimes X$ or $Z \otimes Z$ on each pair and these commute so probabilities behave as classical.

Error correction test check that if Alice & Bob would measure in the Bell Basis they will fail with probability

$1 - \frac{1}{2^{2n}}$ to the space with not too many X, Z, XZ coordinates.

Define

$$\mathcal{H}_{\text{good}} = \{ \Phi_{J,K} \mid |J| < \epsilon n, |K| < \epsilon n \}$$

$$\mathcal{H}_{\text{good}} \otimes \mathcal{H}_E \subseteq \mathcal{H}_{\text{ABE}}$$

P projection on \mathcal{H}_{ABE}

$$\rho' = \frac{\langle P | \rho | P \rangle}{\text{Tr}(P \rho)}$$

has fidelity $1 - \frac{1}{2} \epsilon^{2n}$ to ρ
if test succeeds.

$$\dim \mathcal{H}_{\text{good}} \leq 2^{2nH(\epsilon)}$$

if the error rate is $< \epsilon$.

\Rightarrow Eve's state is supported
by a space of the same
dimension $\sim 2^{2nH(\epsilon)}$ qubits


The error correcting phase reveals $nH(\epsilon)$ bits giving a total of $3nH(\epsilon)$ qubits for Eve's state.

$$3nH(\epsilon) < n$$

$$3H(\epsilon) < 1$$

$$\epsilon \approx 6\%$$

Better bounds on ϵ :



known error reduces the dim of $\mathcal{H}_{\text{good}}$ to

$$2^{\frac{n}{2} H(\epsilon)} \times 2^{\frac{n}{2} H(\epsilon)} = 2^{n H(\epsilon)}$$

so with error correction

$$2 H(\epsilon) < 1 \implies \epsilon \sim 11\%$$

Errors:

Koashi Preskill show that $\dim \mathcal{H}_{\text{good}}$ does not change.

GLLP: Handle many cases but all are easier to analyze by bounding the support of Eve's state.



prob δ for >1 photon

$$nH(\delta)$$

$$2H(\epsilon) + H(\delta) < 1$$