|Location:||SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual|
Contract Design In Combinatorial Settings
Recurrence vs Convergence A Geometric Approach to Learning in Games
"Contract Design In Combinatorial Settings" - Tomer Ezra
We study two combinatorial settings of the contract design problem, in which a principal wants to delegate the execution of a costly task. In the first setting, the principal delegates the task to an agent that can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an associated cost. The principal receives a reward which is a combinatorial function of the actions taken by the agent.
In the second setting, we study the single-principal multi-agent contract problem, in which the principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task.
We design (approximately) optimal algorithms for both settings along with impossibility results for various classes of combinatorial functions.
This talk is based on joint work with Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, and Maya Schlesinger.
- Davide Legacci
Abstract: In this talk I will discuss convergence and cycles of mirror descent algorithms in games by means of geometrical decomposition technique based on Hodge theory, and present a recent application to two-players first-price sealed-bid auctions.No Notes/Supplements Uploaded