Seminar

"Optimal Impartial Selection" - Felix Fischer

Absrtact: I will consider selection rules that map any directed graph (without loops) to a subset of its vertices. A selection rule is impartial if the selection of a vertex is independent of its outgoing edges, and an optimal impartial rule is one that selects vertices with large indegrees. The idea is that vertices and edges represent individuals and nominations among individuals, and we want to select highly nominated individuals without individuals having an influence on their own selection. I will discuss what is know about the problem and point to some open questions.



The talk is based on joint work with Noga Alon, Antje Bjelde, Javier Cembrano, David Hannon, Max Klimm, Ariel Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz.

"Mechanism Design for Imperfect Rationality" - Carmine Ventre

Abstract: Catering to the incentives of people with imperfect rationality requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. In this seminar, we will talk about two notions, Obviously strategyproofness (OSP) and Non-Obviously Manipulability (NOM), that have recently emerged as concepts of interest to this research agenda. OSP is a strengthening of strategyproofness wherein imperfect rationality may lead to unprofitable deviations from honest behaviour. We will discuss this concept, with a particular emphasis on its algorithmic nature. NOM mechanisms, instead, are built on the more optimistic viewpoint that misbehavior is limited to those deviations that are "easy" to understand. We will discuss how these mechanisms can leverage imperfect decision making to guarantee incentive compatibility.