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Stable Matching as Transportation

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023

November 06, 2023 (09:45 AM PST - 10:30 AM PST)
Speaker(s): Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley)
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
  • stable matching

  • optimal transportation

Primary Mathematics Subject Classification
Secondary Mathematics Subject Classification

Stable Matching as Transportation


We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection with the canonical optimal transportation problem. Stable matchings are approximated by solutions to certain convex optimal transport problems, while egalitarian matchings are approximated by concave problems. Our approach describes structural properties of stable matchings in specific markets. The results generalize to multi-sided matching problems, and allow us to consider team formation, supply chain, and other applications.

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Stable Matching as Transportation

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