Nov 06, 2023
Monday
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08:45 AM - 09:00 AM
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Welcome
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
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Kidney Exchange: Within and Across Borders
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
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Stable Matching as Transportation
Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection with the canonical optimal transportation problem. Stable matchings are approximated by solutions to certain convex optimal transport problems, while egalitarian matchings are approximated by concave problems. Our approach describes structural properties of stable matchings in specific markets. The results generalize to multi-sided matching problems, and allow us to consider team formation, supply chain, and other applications.
- Supplements
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10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
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Break
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
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Couples can be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples
David Manlove (University of Glasgow)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
We describe a novel polynomial-time algorithm for the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) that can find a near-feasible stable matching (adjusting the hospitals' capacities by at most 1) when couples' preferences are responsive (i.e., if one member switches to a better hospital, than the couple also improves) and subcomplete (i.e., each pair of hospitals that are individually acceptable to both members are jointly acceptable for the couple) by reducing to an instance of the Stable Fixtures problem.
We also present a new polynomial-time algorithm for HRC in a responsive, subcomplete instance that is a Dual Market, or where all couples are one of several possible types. We also describe several hardness results. We show that HRC with responsive and subcomplete couples is NP-hard, even with other strong restrictions. We also show that HRC with a Dual Market is NP-hard under several simultaneous restrictions. Finally, we show that the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in HRC is very hard to approximate, even if each couple applies to only one pair of hospitals.
Our polynomial-time solvability results greatly expand the class of known tractable instances of HRC and provide strong evidence as to why long-standing entry-level labour markets that allow couples such as the National Resident Matching Program remain successful to this day. This is joint work with Gergely Csáji, Iain McBride and James Trimble.
- Supplements
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11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
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Advancing Stability in Matching Markets: Multi-Modal Preferences and Beyond
Jiehua Chen (Technische Universität Wien)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
In this talk, we explore two recent advances that challenge traditional assumptions and broaden our understanding of what stability can entail.
First, we consider the impact of multi-modal preferences--a scenario in which each agent may possess multiple preference lists, potentially based on different criteria. We introduce three natural stability concepts for this setting, investigate their mutual relations, and focus on the computational complexity associated with determining stable matchings under these concepts.
Next, we shift to novel quantitative stability notions, robustness and near-stability, which respectively strengthen and relax the classical stability definition. These new metrics not only facilitate a fine-grained stability analysis but also enable the exploration of trade-offs between stability and social optimality. We probe the computational challenges posed by these nuanced stability perspectives by showing that determining robustness is easy while finding a socially optimal and nearly stable matching is hard.
- Supplements
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12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
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Poster Sessions and Lunch
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
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Old and New Results on Matching, Assignment, and Selection Problems
Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
I’ll discuss a few results on matching, assignment, and selection problems. The talk will highlight some classical results and discuss recent developments that explore variations on these themes.
- Supplements
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03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
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Afternoon Tea
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
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Matching Markets without Money: Closing Panel
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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Nov 07, 2023
Tuesday
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09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
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Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
We introduce two extensions of the Walrasian mechanism for quasilinear economies to allow agents to report non-concave values and non-convex costs. The extended mechanisms, which always deliver feasible, near-efficient allocations with no budget deficit, are computationally undemanding and nearly incentive-compatible. We also introduce an extension of the First Welfare Theorem allowing us to upper bound the welfare losses from these mechanisms.
- Supplements
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09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
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The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions
Elizabeth Baldwin (University of Oxford)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
Product-mix auctions are sealed-bid mechanisms for trading multiple units of multiple differentiated goods. They implement competitive-equilibrium allocations based on the preferences that participants express in a geometric language. Versions we have implemented are easy to use and understand. All concave substitutes (respectively, strong substitutes) preferences can be uniquely represented, and no other preferences can be represented, by appropriate sets of permitted bids in the corresponding version of this language. These languages thus also provide new characterizations of ordinary substitutes, and of strong substitutes. We discuss implementation of the auctions, and extensions and variants of the language, e.g., allowing for budget constraints.
- Supplements
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Slides
1.55 MB application/pdf
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10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
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Break
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
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Workably Competitive Electricity Markets: Practice and Theory
Shmuel Oren (UC Berkeley)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
Socio economic forces, development in generation technologies and environmental considerations have led over two decades ago to restructuring of the electric power systems in the US and in many systems worldwide, transforming them from vertically integrated regulated monopolies to competitive market based systems. This talk will review the basic structure and elements of the prevailing Standard Market Design adopted in the US under FERC guidance. I will also sketch the theoretical foundation underlying this design, which is based on strong convexity assumption that do not hold in practice. I will then describe alternative approaches and recent developments focusing on price formation that attempt to address distortions due to non convexities. These distortion have become more prominent and problematic due to the increased share of intermittent renewable resources in the electricity supply mix.
- Supplements
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11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
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(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
An obstacle to using market mechanisms to allocate indivisible goods (such as courses to students) is the non-existence of competitive equilibria (CE). To surmount this, Arrow and Hahn proposed the notion of social-approximate equilibria: a price vector and corresponding excess demands that are `small'. We identify a class of preferences called $\Delta$-substitutes, and show that social approximate equilibria where the bound on excess demand, good-by-good, is $2(\Delta-1)$ independent of the size of the economy. When $\Delta=1$ existence of CE is guaranteed even in the presence of income effects. This sufficient condition strictly generalizes prior conditions.
These results rely on a new type of Shapley-Folkman-Starr Lemma which could be of independent interest.
This is joint work with Thanh Nguyen.
- Supplements
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12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
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Poster Sessions and Lunch
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
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Beyond Classical Fisher Markets: Nonconvexities and Online Allocations
Yinyu Ye (Stanford University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
The Fisher market is one of the most fundamental models for resource allocation. However, classical Fisher markets (i) only consider two types of constraints, i.e., budgets of individual buyers and capacities of goods, and (ii) involve a complete information setting wherein buyers' utilities are known, and all the transactions happen in a static market. In this talk, we present generalizations of classical Fisher markets to settings when agents have additional linear constraints and when buyers arrive at the market sequentially with utilities and budgets that are not known a priori to the market designer.
We first introduce Fisher markets with additional linear constraints and study the properties of the resulting equilibria. Notably, the addition of linear constraints introduces non-convexities into Fisher markets as the equilibrium price set may be non-convex, and computing equilibria is, in general, PPAD-hard. Yet, to set equilibrium prices, we introduce a budget-adjusted social optimization problem (BA-SOP), whose optimal dual variables correspond to the equilibrium prices. Further, since solving BA-SOP can be computationally intensive and requires centralized knowledge of all agents' utilities, we propose a new class of distributed algorithms based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) to compute equilibrium prices.
Next, we extend the above-mentioned distributed implementation to the online setting when agents arrive sequentially at the market with privately known utility and budget parameters drawn i.i.d. from some distribution. In this setting, we study the performance limitations of static pricing approaches, which set the same prices for all users, and develop two adaptive pricing algorithms, one with knowledge of the distribution and another that solely relies on past observations of user consumption, i.e., revealed preference feedback, with improved performance guarantees.
- Supplements
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03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
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Afternoon Tea
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
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Non-Convex Auction Markets: Closing Panel
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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05:00 PM - 06:20 PM
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Reception
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- Location
- SLMath: Front Courtyard
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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Nov 08, 2023
Wednesday
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09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
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Dual Reduction and Elementary Games with Senders and Receivers
Roger Myerson (University of Chicago)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
Consider the incentive constraints that define the incentive-compatible mechanisms of a senders-receivers game. Duals of these linear constraints form Markov chains on the senders' type sets and the receivers' action sets. The minimal nonempty absorbing sets of these Markov chains can be interpreted as the types and actions in a dual-reduced game. Any incentive-compatible mechanism of a dual-reduced game induces an equivalent incentive compatible mechanism for the original game. We say that a game is elementary if all nontrivial incentive constraints can be satisfied as strict inequalities in incentive-compatible mechanisms. Any senders-receivers game can be reduced to an elementary game by iterative dual reduction.
- Supplements
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09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
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Algorithmic Contract Design
Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
Contract design captures situations where a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of costly actions. The principal can only observe the outcome, which is stochastically determined by the chosen action. The principal incentivizes the desired action through a contract, that specifies payments based on the observed outcome. In this talk, I will survey several papers on combinatorial contracts, which highlight different sources of complexity that arise in contract design. The first (FOCS’21,SODA’24) is where the agent can choose any subset of a given set of actions; the second (STOC’23) is where the principal motivates a team of agents. We provide (approximation) algorithms and hardness results for the optimal contract problem in these scenarios.
Based on joint work with Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Yoav Gal Tzur and Thomas Kesselheim.
- Supplements
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Slides
5.22 MB application/pdf
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10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
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Break
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
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Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents
Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
I will discuss a framework that approximately extends the classical theory of mechanism design for linear agents (following Myerson, 1981) to broad families of non-linear agent preferences. Optimal mechanism design for non-linear agents is generally analytically intractable. On the other hand, the presented framework shows that intuitions from linear agents approximately extend to non-linear agents. The talk will motivate the approach and analysis framework and sketch the main ideas that go into proving such approximation results.
Joint work with Yiding Feng and Yingkai Li.
- Supplements
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11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
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Mechanism Design for Humans
Sigal Oren (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
We extend two classic settings in mechanism design with behavioral assumptions on the bidders' behavior. We first consider Walrasian equilibrium in combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit the endowment effect (e.g., their value for items increases with ownership). Next, we leverage results in behavioral economics on lying to design auctions for allocating a single item for bidders that will only lie about their value under certain conditions.
- Supplements
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12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
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Lunch
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
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Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
How should a seller offer quantity or quality differentiated products if they have no information about the distribution of demand? We consider a seller who cares about the "profit guarantee" of a pricing rule, that is, the minimum ratio of expected profits to expected social surplus for any distribution of demand.
We show that the profit guarantee is maximized by setting the price markup over cost equal to the elasticity of the cost function. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible demand distributions. With a constant elasticity cost function, constant markup pricing provides the optimal revenue guarantee across all possible demand distributions and the lower bound is attained under a Pareto distribution. We characterize how profits and consumer surplus vary with the distribution of values and show that Pareto distributions are extremal. We also provide a revenue guarantee for general cost functions. We establish equivalent results for optimal procurement policies that support maximal surplus guarantees for the buyer given all possible cost distributions of the sellers.
- Supplements
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03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
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Break
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Closing Panel
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Supplements
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Nov 09, 2023
Thursday
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09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
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Stability and Learning in Strategic Games
Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium
- Video
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- Abstract
Over the last two decades we have developed good understanding how to quantify the impact of strategic user behavior on outcomes in many games (including traffic routing and online auctions) and showed that the resulting bounds extend to repeated games assuming players use a form of no-regret learning to adapt to the environment. We will review how this area evolved since its early days, and also discuss some of the new frontiers, including when repeated interactions have carry-over effects between rounds: when outcomes in one round effect the game in the future, as is the case in many applications. In this talk, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game modeling repeated auction with budgets and queuing systems: routers compete for servers, where packets that do not get served need to be resent, resulting in a system where the number of packets at each round depends on the success of the routers in the previous rounds. In joint work with Giannis Fikioris and Jason Gaitonde respectively, we analyze the resulting highly dependent random processes, and show bounds on the resulting budgeted welfare for auctions and the excess server capacity needed to guarantee that all packets get served in the queuing system despite the selfish (myopic) behavior of the participants.
- Supplements
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09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
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Statistical Contract Theory
Michael Jordan (University of California, Berkeley)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
Contract theory is the study of economic incentives when parties transact in the presence of information asymmetries. We augment classical contract theory to incorporate a role for learning from data, where the overall goal of the adaptive mechanism is to obtain desired statistical behavior. We consider applications of this framework to problems in federated learning, the delegation of data collection, and principal-agent regulatory mechanisms.
- Supplements
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10:30 AM - 10:35 AM
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Group Photo
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- Location
- SLMath: Front Courtyard
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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10:35 AM - 11:00 AM
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Break
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
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Learning Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions and Contests
Martin Bichler (TU München)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do not have a rigorous mathematical solution theory. The lack of analytical or numerical techniques with guaranteed convergence for the equilibrium problem has plagued the field and limited equilibrium analysis to rather simple auction models such as single-object auctions. Recent progress in equilibrium learning led to algorithms that find equilibrium under a wide variety of model assumptions. The talk will summarize empirical results and theoretical insights on the convergence of equilibrium learning algorithms.
- Supplements
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11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
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Learning Dynamics for Nash or Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Ioannis Panageas (University of California, Irvine)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Abstract
In this talk, we will be focusing on learning in two-player games. We will provide a brief introduction on the possible behaviors of learning algorithms and will mention various techniques that have been heavily used and guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. Finally we will show how these techniques can be used to learn Nash equilibria in rank-1 games and what implications these techniques have for general-sum games.
- Supplements
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12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
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Lunch
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Supplements
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02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
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New directions in how computer science can inform the design of economic mechanisms and systems: Automated mechanism design, necessarily exponentially long theories, AI mediators, and fast convergence to high welfare
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University)
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium
- Video
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- Abstract
I will present new results in four directions in how computer science can inform the design of economic mechanisms and systems. First, I will discuss automated mechanism design, with a focus on the number of samples one needs from the prior distribution, and also how flexible a mechanism class one should optimize over given a number of samples. Second, I will show that there are cases where the characterization of an optimal mechanism—e.g., optimal multi-item sales mechanism—requires an exponentially long description and that may explain why manual mechanism design has not been able to solve the problem for over 40 years. Third, I will describe AI mediators. Perhaps surprisingly, an optimal communication equilibrium (of which mechanism design and information design are special cases) can be computed in polynomial time, and the recent breakthroughs in two-player imperfect-information game solving can be leveraged for the problem. I will also discuss how the mediator can steer the agents to a good equilibrium. Fourth, I present a family of no-regret learning dynamics (including optimistic mirror descent (OMD)) that either reaches a Nash equilibrium or yields welfare greater than the robust price of anarchy. This yields the best approximation bound for welfare maximization under polynomial-time algorithms. I also show that when full efficiency is guaranteed via smoothness, Nash equilibrium finding is tractable via OMD. Finally, in 2-player games, when OMD does not converge to a Nash equilibrium, OMD converges to coarse correlated equilibrium with an infinite rate of convergence, i.e., in strongly polynomial time.
- Supplements
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03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
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Afternoon Tea
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- Location
- SLMath: Atrium
- Video
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- Abstract
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- Supplements
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03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
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Learning in Games and Markets: Closing Panel
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- Location
- SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
- Video
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- Supplements
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