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Schedule, Notes/Handouts & Videos

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023

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Nov 06, 2023
Monday
08:45 AM - 09:00 AM
  Welcome
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Kidney Exchange: Within and Across Borders
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  Stable Matching as Transportation
Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley)
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Couples can be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples
David Manlove (University of Glasgow)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  Advancing Stability in Matching Markets: Multi-Modal Preferences and Beyond
Jiehua Chen (Technische Universität Wien)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Poster Sessions and Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  Old and New Results on Matching, Assignment, and Selection Problems
Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Afternoon Tea
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Matching Markets without Money: Closing Panel
Nov 07, 2023
Tuesday
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions
Elizabeth Baldwin (University of Oxford)
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Workably Competitive Electricity Markets: Practice and Theory
Shmuel Oren (UC Berkeley)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  (Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Poster Sessions and Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  Beyond Classical Fisher Markets: Nonconvexities and Online Allocations
Yinyu Ye (Stanford University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Afternoon Tea
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Non-Convex Auction Markets: Closing Panel
05:00 PM - 06:20 PM
  Reception
Nov 08, 2023
Wednesday
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Dual Reduction and Elementary Games with Senders and Receivers
Roger Myerson (University of Chicago)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  Algorithmic Contract Design
Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University)
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents
Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  Mechanism Design for Humans
Sigal Oren (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Break
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Closing Panel
Nov 09, 2023
Thursday
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Stability and Learning in Strategic Games
Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  Statistical Contract Theory
Michael Jordan (University of California, Berkeley)
10:30 AM - 10:35 AM
  Group Photo
10:35 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Learning Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions and Contests
Martin Bichler (TU M√ľnchen)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  Learning Dynamics for Nash or Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Ioannis Panageas (University of California, Irvine)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  New directions in how computer science can inform the design of economic mechanisms and systems: Automated mechanism design, necessarily exponentially long theories, AI mediators, and fast convergence to high welfare
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Afternoon Tea
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Learning in Games and Markets: Closing Panel