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Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023

November 08, 2023 (11:00 AM PST - 11:45 AM PST)
Speaker(s): Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
Primary Mathematics Subject Classification No Primary AMS MSC
Secondary Mathematics Subject Classification No Secondary AMS MSC

Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents


I will discuss a framework that approximately extends the classical theory of mechanism design for linear agents (following Myerson, 1981) to broad families of non-linear agent preferences.  Optimal mechanism design for non-linear agents is generally analytically intractable.  On the other hand, the presented framework shows that intuitions from linear agents approximately extend to non-linear agents.  The talk will motivate the approach and analysis framework and sketch the main ideas that go into proving such approximation results.
Joint work with Yiding Feng and Yingkai Li.

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Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents

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