Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
Tags/Keywords
Approximate efficiency
Approximate incentive-compatibility
market design
Non- convexity
Prices
Rationing
Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
We introduce two extensions of the Walrasian mechanism for quasilinear economies to allow agents to report non-concave values and non-convex costs. The extended mechanisms, which always deliver feasible, near-efficient allocations with no budget deficit, are computationally undemanding and nearly incentive-compatible. We also introduce an extension of the First Welfare Theorem allowing us to upper bound the welfare losses from these mechanisms.
Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
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