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Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023

November 07, 2023 (09:00 AM PST - 09:45 AM PST)
Speaker(s): Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
Tags/Keywords
  • Approximate efficiency

  • Approximate incentive-compatibility

  • market design

  • Non- convexity

  • Prices

  • Rationing

Primary Mathematics Subject Classification
Secondary Mathematics Subject Classification
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Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem

Abstract

We introduce two extensions of the Walrasian mechanism for quasilinear economies to allow agents to report non-concave values and non-convex costs. The extended mechanisms, which always deliver feasible, near-efficient allocations with no budget deficit, are computationally undemanding and nearly incentive-compatible. We also introduce an extension of the First Welfare Theorem allowing us to upper bound the welfare losses from these mechanisms.

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Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem

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