Home /  Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design

Workshop

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023
Registration Deadline: November 09, 2023 7 months ago
To apply for Funding you must register by: August 31, 2023 10 months ago
Parent Program:
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Atrium, Online/Virtual, Front Courtyard, 2nd Floor Deck
Organizers LEAD Martin Bichler (TU München), LEAD Péter Biró (KRTK – Institute of Economics)
Speaker(s)

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Description
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The workshop is aimed at exploring core subjects in the field of market and mechanism design, such as the design of non-convex auction markets, the design of matching markets with preferences, algorithmic mechanism design, and learning in games. These topics are interrelated and deeply rooted in mathematics and computer science. Each day of the 4-day workshop is devoted to one of these topics with talks by leading scholars in the field and panel discussions on major open problems. Overview of schedule and speakers: Nov 6: Matching Markets without Money: Jiehua Chen (TU Vienna), Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley), David Manlove (University of Glasgow), Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University), Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University) Nov 7: Non-Convex Auction Markets: Elizabeth Baldwin (Oxford), Paul Milgrom (Stanford), Shmuel Oren (UC Berkeley), Rakesh Vohra (UPenn), Yinyu Ye (Stanford) Reception Nov 8: Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Dirk Bergemann (Yale), Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv), Jason Hartline (Northwestern), Roger Myerson (Chicago), Sigal Oren (Ben Gurion) Nov 9: Learning in Games and Markets: Michael Jordan (UC Berkeley), Martin Bichler (TU Munich), Ioannis Panageas (UC Irvine), Tuomas Sandholm (CMU), Eva Tardos (Cornell) Bibliography Zoom Link
Keywords and Mathematics Subject Classification (MSC)
Tags/Keywords
  • market design

  • mechanism design

  • auctions

  • matching

  • approximation

  • equilibrium analysis

  • algorithmic game theory

  • complexity

  • economic theory

  • discrete optimization

  • graph theory

  • mathematical programming

Primary Mathematics Subject Classification
Secondary Mathematics Subject Classification No Secondary AMS MSC
Funding & Logistics Show All Collapse

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To apply for funding, you must register by the funding application deadline displayed above.

Students, recent PhDs, women, and members of underrepresented minorities are particularly encouraged to apply. Funding awards are typically made 6 weeks before the workshop begins. Requests received after the funding deadline are considered only if additional funds become available.

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For information about recommended hotels for visits of under 30 days, visit Short-Term Housing. Questions? Contact coord@slmath.org.

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Schedule, Notes/Handouts & Videos
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Nov 06, 2023
Monday
08:45 AM - 09:00 AM
  Welcome
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Kidney Exchange: Within and Across Borders
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  Stable Matching as Transportation
Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley)
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Couples can be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples
David Manlove (University of Glasgow)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  Advancing Stability in Matching Markets: Multi-Modal Preferences and Beyond
Jiehua Chen (Technische Universität Wien)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Poster Sessions and Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  Old and New Results on Matching, Assignment, and Selection Problems
Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Afternoon Tea
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Matching Markets without Money: Closing Panel
Nov 07, 2023
Tuesday
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions
Elizabeth Baldwin (University of Oxford)
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Workably Competitive Electricity Markets: Practice and Theory
Shmuel Oren (UC Berkeley)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  (Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Poster Sessions and Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  Beyond Classical Fisher Markets: Nonconvexities and Online Allocations
Yinyu Ye (Stanford University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Afternoon Tea
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Non-Convex Auction Markets: Closing Panel
05:00 PM - 06:20 PM
  Reception
Nov 08, 2023
Wednesday
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Dual Reduction and Elementary Games with Senders and Receivers
Roger Myerson (University of Chicago)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  Algorithmic Contract Design
Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University)
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents
Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  Mechanism Design for Humans
Sigal Oren (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Break
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Closing Panel
Nov 09, 2023
Thursday
09:00 AM - 09:45 AM
  Stability and Learning in Strategic Games
Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
09:45 AM - 10:30 AM
  Statistical Contract Theory
Michael Jordan (University of California, Berkeley)
10:30 AM - 10:35 AM
  Group Photo
10:35 AM - 11:00 AM
  Break
11:00 AM - 11:45 AM
  Learning Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions and Contests
Martin Bichler (TU München)
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM
  Learning Dynamics for Nash or Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Ioannis Panageas (University of California, Irvine)
12:30 PM - 02:30 PM
  Lunch
02:30 PM - 03:15 PM
  New directions in how computer science can inform the design of economic mechanisms and systems: Automated mechanism design, necessarily exponentially long theories, AI mediators, and fast convergence to high welfare
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University)
03:15 PM - 03:45 PM
  Afternoon Tea
03:45 PM - 05:00 PM
  Learning in Games and Markets: Closing Panel