Mechanism Design for Humans
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design November 06, 2023 - November 09, 2023
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual
Primary Mathematics Subject Classification
No Primary AMS MSC
Secondary Mathematics Subject Classification
No Secondary AMS MSC
Mechanism Design for Humans
We extend two classic settings in mechanism design with behavioral assumptions on the bidders' behavior. We first consider Walrasian equilibrium in combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit the endowment effect (e.g., their value for items increases with ownership). Next, we leverage results in behavioral economics on lying to design auctions for allocating a single item for bidders that will only lie about their value under certain conditions.
Mechanism Design for Humans
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