Current Seminars
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MMD Seminar: "Fairness in Kidney Exchange Programmes" & "How Good Are Privacy Guarantees? Platform Architecture and the Learning-Privacy Tradeoff"
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Péter Biró (KRTK, Eotvos Lorand Research Network), Alireza Fallah (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)"How Good Are Privacy Guarantees? Platform Architecture and the Learning-Privacy Tradeoff" - Alireza Fallah
Abstract: Many platforms deploy data collected from users for a multitude of purposes. While some are beneficial to users, others are costly to their privacy. The presence of these privacy costs means that platforms may need to provide guarantees about how and to what extent user data will be harvested for activities such as targeted ads, individualized pricing, and sales to third parties. In this work, we build a multi-stage model in which users decide whether to share their data based on privacy guarantees. We first introduce a novel mask-shuffle mechanism and prove it is Pareto optimal—meaning that it leaks the least about the users’ data for any given leakage about the underlying common parameter. We then show that under any mask-shuffle mechanism, there exists a unique equilibrium in which privacy guarantees balance privacy costs and utility gains from the pooling of user data for purposes such as assessment of health risks or product development. Paradoxically, we show that as users’ value of pooled data increases, the equilibrium of the game leads to lower user welfare. This is because platforms take advantage of this change to reduce privacy guarantees so much that user utility declines (whereas it would have increased with a given mechanism). Furthermore, we show that platforms have incentives to choose data architectures that systematically differ from those that are optimal from the user’s point of view. In particular, we identify a class of pivot mechanisms, linking individual privacy to choices by others, which platforms prefer to implement and which make users significantly worse off.
Based on joint work with Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Asu Ozdaglar.
Updated on Sep 29, 2023 01:41 PM PDT
Upcoming Seminars
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UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Online/Virtual, Eisenbud AuditoriumCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching: Panel Discussions on Kidney Exchanges
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University), Péter Biró (KRTK, Eotvos Lorand Research Network), Negar Matoorian (Stanford University)We will have some short presentations and a moderated discussion with panelists, who have experience in (re-)designing such applications, and then open discussion on possible research questions on various aspects, including policy design, optimisation, and implementation. We share knowledge on the specific features of applications, availability of real and generated datasets, and codes/software solutions. The aim is to better understand the current trends, new policy approaches, and practical challenges in implementation in the spirit of "Engineering Economics".
Updated on Sep 28, 2023 12:35 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch: Opinion Dynamics and the Wisdom of Crowds
Location: Balcony outside the library Speakers: Chang Liu (The University of New South Wales)Updated on Oct 02, 2023 02:05 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar: "School Choice with Information Inequality" & "Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions"
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Negar Matoorian (Stanford University), Daniel Schoepflin (Drexel University)"School Choice with Information Inequality" - Negar Matoorian
Abstract: “School choice policies are predicated on the assumption that parents have enough information to make an informed decision on where to send their children… districts don't always do a good job of disseminating information and explaining options to certain groups – low-income parents and those whose children are first-generation Americans, for example” (US News & World Report, Aug 2015).
We study the consequence of unequal access to school value information in the popular mechanisms for allocation of seats in the public school system. We show that in the Deferred Acceptance mechanism students with inferior information suffer from curse of assignment and might try to mitigate this curse by ranking schools with higher capacity or schools they have priority at prior to schools that are known to have a higher educational quality. Our model lays the ground for studying the welfare consequences of policies such as information disclosure and priority design in school choice environments with asymmetric information.
"Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions" - Dan Schoepflin
Abstract: We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof budget-feasible procurement auctions have been proposed, aiming to maximize the value of the buyer, while eliciting each seller's true cost for providing their service. Our main result is a novel method for designing budget-feasible auctions, leading to solutions that outperform the previously proposed auctions in multiple ways. First, our solutions take the form of descending clock auctions, rather than sealed-bid auctions, and thus satisfy a list of very appealing properties, such as obvious strategyproofness and unconditional winner privacy, making these auctions much more likely to be used in practice. Second, in contrast to previous results that heavily depend on randomization, our auctions are deterministic. In fact, our deterministic auctions achieve a constant-approximation for submodular valuations, resolving a main open question in this literature. Finally, we improve the best-known approximation factor for monotone submodular valuations, the focus of most of the prior work.
Updated on Sep 28, 2023 02:51 PM PDT -
Tales from the Trenches
Location: SLMath: Online/Virtual, Eisenbud Auditorium Speakers: Moon Duchin (Tufts University)In this informal presentation, I'll tell you about my personal experience with courts, commissions, nonprofits, and policymakers in the last three years on issues around voting and civil rights. This includes expert work for redistricting litigation in seven states and one city, plus work designing the partisan gerrymandering test that made its way before Congress. All welcome! Lots of pictures! Talk will be followed by a trip down the hill for happy hour.
Created on Oct 03, 2023 09:27 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/Virtual Speakers: Zhanzhan Zhao (Georgia Institute of Technology)Created on Sep 21, 2023 03:15 PM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Oct 04, 2023 02:08 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:33 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 20, 2023 08:00 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Yotam Gafni (Technion---Israel Institute of Technology)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching: Refugee Assignment
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 20, 2023 01:18 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Oct 03, 2023 08:37 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Tomer Ezra (Università di Roma "La Sapienza'')Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:38 PM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching: Course Allocation
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 20, 2023 01:18 PM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:38 PM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:36 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:43 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar: Incentives under the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Adrian Vetta (McGill University)Updated on Sep 14, 2023 11:56 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Andres Cristi (University of Chile)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:45 PM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:39 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:45 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Rafael Frongillo (University of Colorado at Boulder)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Di Feng (University of Lausanne)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:41 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:59 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:42 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:45 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:59 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 11:00 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 11:00 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: Downstairs DeckCreated on Sep 18, 2023 09:52 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:43 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: Downstairs DeckCreated on Sep 18, 2023 09:52 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:43 AM PDT
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ADJOINT 2024
ADJOINT is a yearlong program that provides opportunities for U.S. mathematicians – especially those from the African Diaspora – to conduct collaborative research on topics at the forefront of mathematical and statistical research. Participants will spend two weeks taking part in an intensive collaborative summer session at SLMath (formerly MSRI). The two-week summer session for ADJOINT 2024 will take place June 24 to July 5, 2024 in Berkeley, California. Researchers can participate in either of the following ways: (1) joining ADJOINT small groups under the guidance of some of the nation's foremost mathematicians and statisticians to expand their research portfolio into new areas, or (2) applying to Self-ADJOINT as part of an existing or newly-formed independent research group to work on a new or established research project. Throughout the following academic year, the program provides conference and travel support to increase opportunities for collaboration, maximize researcher visibility, and engender a sense of community among participants.
Updated on Oct 02, 2023 11:15 AM PDT
Past Seminars
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Seminar Graduate Students Seminar: Contract Design Under Uncertainty
Updated on Sep 28, 2023 03:08 PM PDT -
Seminar Fair Machine Learning Seminar: Introduction to Fair Machine Learning
Updated on Sep 27, 2023 01:56 PM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Seminar Social Choice Seminar: Proportionality in ranked elections
Updated on Sep 29, 2023 02:55 PM PDT -
Seminar MMD Seminar: "Markets and Transaction Costs" & "Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs"
Updated on Sep 22, 2023 08:12 AM PDT -
Seminar Working Group on Applied Matching: Panel Discussions on School Choice
Updated on Sep 21, 2023 03:08 PM PDT -
Seminar Redistricting Working Group
Created on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Seminar MMD Seminar: "Optimal Waitlist Policies in One-Sided Markets" & "Market Equilibria: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly"
Updated on Sep 21, 2023 09:25 AM PDT -
Seminar Social Choice Seminar: "A Friendly Introduction to the Shapley Value and the Combinatorics of Parking" & "Nonbossy Mechanisms and Voting Rules"
Updated on Sep 21, 2023 03:03 PM PDT -
Seminar Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Created on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Seminar Network Science Lunch: "Taxonomy of Social Media Platform Architectures: Shaping Polarization and Radicalization through Social Norms"
Updated on Sep 25, 2023 01:34 PM PDT -
Seminar Fair Machine Learning Seminar: "Fairness in ML: Basics of Metrics and Data"
Updated on Sep 20, 2023 08:21 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar Network Science Lunch
Updated on Sep 22, 2023 10:34 AM PDT -
Seminar Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Updated on Sep 20, 2023 04:00 PM PDT -
Seminar Redistricting Working Group
Created on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar Graduate Students Seminar: Geometry of No-Regret Learning in Games
Updated on Sep 15, 2023 11:33 AM PDT -
Seminar Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Created on Sep 18, 2023 10:22 AM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Sep 12, 2023 09:04 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Sep 12, 2023 09:02 AM PDT -
Seminar Social Choice Seminar
Created on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
Seminar Redistricting Working Group
Created on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar Meet the Staff Tea & Mugs
Created on Aug 31, 2023 01:32 PM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Aug 31, 2023 11:52 AM PDT