Current Seminars
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UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT
Upcoming Seminars
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Working Group on Applied Matching: Panel Discussions on School Choice
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/Virtual Speakers: Péter Biró (KRTK, Eotvos Lorand Research Network), Andres Cristi (University of Chile), Irene Lo (Stanford University)We will have some short presentations and a moderated discussion with panelists, who have experience in (re-)designing such applications, and then open discussion on possible research questions on various aspects, including policy design, optimisation, and implementation. We share knowledge on the specific features of applications, availability of real and generated datasets, and codes/software solutions. The aim is to better understand the current trends, new policy approaches, and practical challenges in implementation in the spirit of "Engineering Economics".
Updated on Sep 21, 2023 03:08 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar: "Markets and Transaction Costs" & "Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs"
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Simon Finster (CREST-ENSAE), Simon Jantschgi (University of Oxford)"Markets and Transaction Costs" - Simon Jantschgi
Abstract: Transaction costs are ubiquitous in markets. We show that their presence can fundamentally alter incentives and welfare in markets in which the price equates supply and demand. We categorize transaction costs into two types. Asymptotically uninfluenceable transaction costs---such as fixed and price fees---preserve the key asymptotic properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and to aggregate uncertainty. In contrast, influenceable transaction costs---such as spread fees---lead to complex strategic behavior (which we call price guessing) and may result in severe market failure. In our analysis of optimal design, we focus on transaction costs that are fees collected by a platform as revenue. We show how optimal design depends on the traders' beliefs. In particular, with common prior beliefs, any asymptotically uninfluenceable fee schedule can be scaled to be optimal, while purely influenceable fee schedules lead to zero revenue.
Our insights extend beyond markets equalizing supply and demand.
Updated on Sep 22, 2023 08:12 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar: Introduction to Fair Machine Learning
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room Speakers: Iván Ojeda-Ruiz (Texas State University), Adrian Vetta (McGill University)Updated on Sep 27, 2023 01:56 PM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Tal Alon (Technion---Israel Institute of Technology)As algorithms increasingly interact with rational, self-interested individuals, their design must take participants’ incentives into account. The traditional focus in algorithmic game theory literature has been the design of algorithms that incentivize truthfulness (as seen, for example, in ad auctions). In this talk, we shift focus to algorithms that incentivize effort, aligning with the economic discipline of contract design.
The goal of this talk is to address some generalizations of the classic contract design model and demonstrate how algorithmic approaches contribute to this research domain. Our primary focus will be a natural contractual problem involving both aspects of effort and truthfulness incentivization. We will see that the optimal mechanisms can be complex and unintuitive, and do not resemble contracts used in practice. We then shift perspective to simple contracts, such as linear or commission-based contracts, and demonstrate that they are close to optimal under certain natural conditions. This provides a justification for the prevalence of simple contracts in practical applications.
Updated on Sep 12, 2023 08:33 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:37 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar: "Learning in Auction Markets" & "How Good Are Privacy Guarantees? Platform Architecture and the Learning-Privacy Tradeoff"
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Péter Biró (KRTK, Eotvos Lorand Research Network), Alireza Fallah (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)"How Good Are Privacy Guarantees? Platform Architecture and the Learning-Privacy Tradeoff" - Alireza Fallah
Abstract: Many platforms deploy data collected from users for a multitude of purposes. While some are beneficial to users, others are costly to their privacy. The presence of these privacy costs means that platforms may need to provide guarantees about how and to what extent user data will be harvested for activities such as targeted ads, individualized pricing, and sales to third parties. In this work, we build a multi-stage model in which users decide whether to share their data based on privacy guarantees. We first introduce a novel mask-shuffle mechanism and prove it is Pareto optimal—meaning that it leaks the least about the users’ data for any given leakage about the underlying common parameter. We then show that under any mask-shuffle mechanism, there exists a unique equilibrium in which privacy guarantees balance privacy costs and utility gains from the pooling of user data for purposes such as assessment of health risks or product development. Paradoxically, we show that as users’ value of pooled data increases, the equilibrium of the game leads to lower user welfare. This is because platforms take advantage of this change to reduce privacy guarantees so much that user utility declines (whereas it would have increased with a given mechanism). Furthermore, we show that platforms have incentives to choose data architectures that systematically differ from those that are optimal from the user’s point of view. In particular, we identify a class of pivot mechanisms, linking individual privacy to choices by others, which platforms prefer to implement and which make users significantly worse off.
Based on joint work with Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Asu Ozdaglar.
Updated on Sep 26, 2023 11:22 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Online/Virtual, Eisenbud AuditoriumCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching: Kidney Exchanges
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 27, 2023 08:48 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Negar Matoorian (Stanford University), Daniel Schoepflin (Drexel University)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 21, 2023 03:15 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:33 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 20, 2023 08:00 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:38 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Yotam Gafni (Technion---Israel Institute of Technology)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:56 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching: Refugee Assignment
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 20, 2023 01:18 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Tomer Ezra (Università di Roma "La Sapienza'')Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:38 PM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching: Course Allocation
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 20, 2023 01:18 PM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:38 PM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:36 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:43 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar: Incentives under the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Adrian Vetta (McGill University)Updated on Sep 14, 2023 11:56 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:57 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Andres Cristi (University of Chile)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:45 PM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:39 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:45 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Rafael Frongillo (University of Colorado at Boulder)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/Virtual Speakers: Di Feng (University of Lausanne)Created on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:58 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:41 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:59 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:42 AM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomUpdated on Sep 22, 2023 01:45 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:59 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 11:00 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Location: Evans Hall 732, UC Berkeley Speakers: Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)Updated on Jul 25, 2023 11:00 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: Downstairs DeckCreated on Sep 18, 2023 09:52 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:43 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Redistricting Working Group
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Working Group on Applied Matching
Location: SLMath: Baker Board Room, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 20, 2023 01:16 PM PDT -
Network Science Lunch
Location: Downstairs DeckCreated on Sep 18, 2023 09:52 AM PDT -
MMD Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualCreated on Sep 08, 2023 08:47 AM PDT -
Social Choice Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Location: SLMath: Baker Board RoomCreated on Sep 20, 2023 08:18 AM PDT -
Graduate Students Seminar
Location: SLMath: Eisenbud Auditorium, Online/VirtualUpdated on Sep 12, 2023 08:43 AM PDT
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ADJOINT 2024
ADJOINT is a yearlong program that provides opportunities for U.S. mathematicians – especially those from the African Diaspora – to conduct collaborative research on topics at the forefront of mathematical and statistical research. Participants will spend two weeks taking part in an intensive collaborative summer session at SLMath (formerly MSRI). The two-week summer session for ADJOINT 2024 will take place June 24 to July 5, 2024 in Berkeley, California. Researchers can participate in either of the following ways: (1) joining ADJOINT small groups under the guidance of some of the nation's foremost mathematicians and statisticians to expand their research portfolio into new areas, or (2) applying to Self-ADJOINT as part of an existing or newly-formed independent research group to work on a new or established research project. Throughout the following academic year, the program provides conference and travel support to increase opportunities for collaboration, maximize researcher visibility, and engender a sense of community among participants.
Updated on Sep 26, 2023 04:01 PM PDT
Past Seminars
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Seminar MMD Seminar: "Optimal Waitlist Policies in One-Sided Markets" & "Market Equilibria: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly"
Updated on Sep 21, 2023 09:25 AM PDT -
Seminar Social Choice Seminar: "A Friendly Introduction to the Shapley Value and the Combinatorics of Parking" & "Nonbossy Mechanisms and Voting Rules"
Updated on Sep 21, 2023 03:03 PM PDT -
Seminar Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Created on Sep 21, 2023 02:17 PM PDT -
Seminar Network Science Lunch: "Taxonomy of Social Media Platform Architectures: Shaping Polarization and Radicalization through Social Norms"
Updated on Sep 25, 2023 01:34 PM PDT -
Seminar Fair Machine Learning Seminar: "Fairness in ML: Basics of Metrics and Data"
Updated on Sep 20, 2023 08:21 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar Network Science Lunch
Updated on Sep 22, 2023 10:34 AM PDT -
Seminar Postdoc Professional Development Seminar
Updated on Sep 20, 2023 04:00 PM PDT -
Seminar Redistricting Working Group
Created on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar Graduate Students Seminar: Geometry of No-Regret Learning in Games
Updated on Sep 15, 2023 11:33 AM PDT -
Seminar Fair Machine Learning Seminar
Created on Sep 18, 2023 10:22 AM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Sep 12, 2023 09:04 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Sep 12, 2023 09:02 AM PDT -
Seminar Social Choice Seminar
Created on Sep 12, 2023 08:09 AM PDT -
Seminar Redistricting Working Group
Created on Sep 13, 2023 11:12 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:55 AM PDT -
Seminar Meet the Staff Tea & Mugs
Created on Aug 31, 2023 01:32 PM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Aug 31, 2023 11:52 AM PDT -
Seminar 5 Minute Talks
Created on Aug 31, 2023 11:52 AM PDT -
Seminar Mentor Meeting (PDs & Early Career Researcher Mentors Only)
Created on Aug 31, 2023 01:36 PM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:54 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:53 AM PDT -
Seminar UC Berkeley Chancellor Course: Market Design
Updated on Jul 25, 2023 10:53 AM PDT -
Seminar Program Associate Meeting
Created on Aug 18, 2023 09:38 AM PDT -
Seminar Postdoc Meeting
Updated on Aug 14, 2023 02:39 PM PDT -
Seminar Program Organizer Lunch Meeting
Updated on Aug 14, 2023 02:49 PM PDT